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Abstract 
Many sources of urban agglomeration, such as the gains from variety, better 
matching, and knowledge creation and diffusion, involve departures from the first-best 
world.  Benefit evaluation of a transportation project must then take into account changes 
in excess burden along with any direct user benefits.  A number of economists have 
addressed this issue, and policymakers in some countries, such as in the United Kingdom, 
have been attempting to include these considerations in their project assessments.  By 
modeling the microstructure of agglomeration economies, we derive second-best benefit 
evaluation formulae for urban transportation improvements. Previous work has 
investigated the same problem, but without explicitly modeling the sources of 
agglomeration economies.  Accordingly, our analysis examines whether earlier results 
remain valid when monopolistic competition with differentiated products provides the 
microfoundation of the agglomeration economies. By explicitly introducing the rural 
sector and multiple cities, we also show that the agglomeration benefits depend on where 
the new workers are from. 
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1. Introduction 
Many of the sources of urban agglomeration, such as gains from variety, better 
matching, and knowledge creation and diffusion, involve departures from the first-best 
world.2  The benefit evaluation of a transportation project must then take into account 
agglomeration benefits along with any direct user benefits.  A number of economists have 
studied this issue, and policymakers in some countries, such as in the United Kingdom, 
have been attempting to include these considerations in their project assessments.3 
Based on past empirical work, urban agglomeration economies are substantial.  For 
instance, a review by Rosenthal and Strange (2004, p. 2133) summarizes the empirical 
findings as follows: “In sum, doubling city size seems to increase productivity by an 
amount that ranges from roughly 3−8%.”  Agglomeration economies on the consumer 
side are also substantial, as argued by Glaeser et al. (2001), with estimates by Tabuchi and 
Yoshida (2000) suggesting economies in the order of 7−12 percent.  Certainly, the benefit 
estimates could exceed 10 percent after combining production and consumption 
agglomeration economies. 
By modeling the microstructure of agglomeration economies, this paper derives 
second-best benefit evaluation formulae for urban transportation improvements.  
Venables (2007) investigated the same problem but without explicitly modeling the 
sources of agglomeration economies.  Accordingly, our analysis examines whether the 
results in this prior work remain valid when monopolistic competition with differentiated 
products provides the microfoundation of agglomeration economies.  By explicitly 
introducing the rural sector and multiple cities, we also show that the agglomeration 
benefits depend on where the new workers are from. 
Extending the Henry George Theorem to a second-best setting with distorted prices, 
Behrens et al. (2010) showed that the optimality condition for the number of cities (or 
equivalently, the optimal size of a city) must be modified to include Harberger’s excess 
                                                 
2
 See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a review of the theoretical analysis of various sources 
of urban agglomeration, Fujita and Thisse (2002) for the New Economic Geography 
approach, and Kanemoto (1990) for the analysis of a nonmonocentric city model. 
3
 See, for example, Venables and Gasiorek (1999), Department of Transport (2005), 
(2008), Graham (2005), (2006), and Vickerman (2007). 
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burden, that is, the weighted sum of induced changes in consumption with weights being 
the price distortions.  New Economic Geography (NEG)-type models of monopolistic 
competition contain distortions of two forms: a price distortion for each variety of the 
differentiated good, and a distortion associated with the number of available varieties 
consumed.  Although the former is well known, the latter has largely escaped the 
attention of the existing literature.  Importantly, because these two types of distortions 
work in opposite directions, the net effect is uncertain.  In this article, we examine 
whether we can obtain similar results with transportation investment projects.  Moreover, 
in yet another departure from Venables (2007), we explicitly introduce the rural sector 
and multiple cities.  We show that the results hinge on whether the new workers are from 
the rural sector or other cities. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we present a model of urban 
agglomeration economies based on monopolistic competition in differentiated 
intermediate products.  Section 3 derives second-best benefit measures of transportation 
investment assuming the number of cities is fixed.  In Section 4, we extend the analysis to 
the situation where transportation investment changes the number of cities.  Section 5 
concludes. 
2. The model 
Our model adds three elements to Venables (2007): (i) an explicit rural sector, (ii) 
multiple cities, and (iii) the microstructure of agglomeration in the urban sector.  We 
ignore income tax distortion because Venables’ analysis is applicable to our model 
without modification.  The economy contains n cities and a rural area, where all cities are 
monocentric, that is, all workers commute to the central business district (CBD).  All 
cities also have the same topographical and technological conditions.  We assume that the 
economy is initially in a symmetric equilibrium where all cities have identical allocations, 
and examine the effect of a small improvement in urban transportation in one of the cities. 
We model the microstructure of agglomeration in such a way as to produce the 
same aggregate production function as Venables (2007).  Here, the production of an urban 
final good requires differentiated intermediate products only and we assume the final 
good is homogeneous.  Final good producers compete with producers in other cities as 
well as other producers located in the same city.  Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume 
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the rural area produces the same final product albeit with a different technology.  While 
the final good is the only good that consumers directly consume, it is also used in the 
production of housing and transportation services.  The final good producers are 
competitive but the intermediate good producers are monopolistically competitive.  We 
assume free-entry (zero-profit) conditions for both types of producers.  For transportation 
and housing, we assume a simple monocentric city model again following Venables 
(2007).  As noted above, these sectors use final products as their sole inputs.  Also for 
simplicity, we assume absentee landlords own land in both urban and rural areas.  
Usefully, it is not difficult to modify this particular assumption. 
Production in cities 
The production of the urban final good requires only differentiated intermediate 
inputs and the production function is additively separable with respect to the inputs: 
( 1 ) , 



  100 )(m i diyFy
where ,  is the input of differentiated intermediate good i, parameter iy Mi   is 
positive ( 0 ) reflecting economies of variety in the intermediate inputs, and  
exhibits increasing returns-to-scale initially though scale economy declines as production 
increases, eventually attaining decreasing returns-to-scale.  More specifically, the scale 
elasticity of production, 
)i(yF
)(/)()( yFyFyy   is assumed to satisfy: 
( 2 ) yyy somefor
1
1)(and,
1
1)0(,0)(   . 
The number (mass) of intermediate goods m is endogenous.  The final good, , is 
homogeneous and its cost of transportation is zero.  We normalize the price of the final 
good as one (1).  There are many final good producers in each city and they take both the 
final good and intermediate good prices as given.  Let k denote the number of final good 
producers. 
0y
The profit maximization problem for a final good producer is: 
( 3 ) . 



 

   m iim i diypdiyF 0
1
0
)(Max


The first-order conditions for  and  are respectively: iy m
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( 4 )  
 

 m iii diyFyFp 0 )()1)(( ,
( 5 )  mm
m
im ypdiyFyF 

   0 )()1)(( .
We can interpret the left-hand side of the inequality in ( 5 ) as the willingness to pay for a 
new variety by a final good producer and the right-hand side as its purchase cost.  
Because all final good producers benefit from a new variety, we sum these over producers 
to obtain the demand price of diversity: 
( 6 )  
 

 m imm diyFykFP 0 )()1)(( ,
and its supply price as: 
( 7 ) mmmm ykpP  , 
where m  is the ‘price’ distortion of variety.  Note that the demand price may exceed the 
supply price because supply side conditions determine the number of intermediate goods 
in addition to the demand side conditions.  The first-order condition ( 4 ) for  yields the 
demand function for intermediate good i: 
iy
( 8 ) , with ))(;(
0 iiii diyFpdy m  


m iii
i
diyFyFp
d
0
)()1)((
1 . 
The free-entry condition for the final good producers is: 
( 9 ) . 0)(
0
1
0


   m iim i diypdiyF 
Next, let us turn our attention to the producers of the intermediate good.  Production 
of an intermediate good requires only labor as an input.  The labor input required for 
producing  of variety i is: iY
( 10 ) fcYN ii  , 
where the fixed cost is f and the constant marginal cost is c in labor units. 
Intermediate good producers have monopoly power because their products are 
differentiated, but an individual producer is sufficiently small not to influence the number 
of intermediate goods, m, and the number of final good producers, k.  Then the demand 
function that producer i is faced with can be written as: 
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( 11 ) , )()( iiiii pkdpDY 
where from ( 8 ) the price elasticity of demand is: 
( 12 ) 
)(
1
)(
)(
yRyFy
yF
Y
p
p
D
Ri
i
i
i 

 , 
and  is equivalent to the measure of relative risk aversion in expected 
utility theory.  The profit of an intermediate good producer is then: 
FFyyRR  /)(
( 13 ) )( fcYwYp iiii  , 
where w is the wage rate.  Profit maximization yields: 
( 14 ) 
)(
1
ii
i
Yp
wcp

 . 
From free entry, the profit of a firm is zero: 
( 15 ) . 0)(  wfYwcp ii
Now we concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium and omit subscript i for an 
intermediate good.  The following lemma obtains the equilibrium conditions for the urban 
production sector. 
 
Lemma 1 (Urban Production Sector) The quantity of an intermediate input, y, used by 
a final good producer satisfies: 
( 16 )  

1
1
)(
)()(
yF
yFyy . 
The production of the differentiated good, Y, is determined by: 
( 17 ) , fYRfcY R  )()(
where FFyyRR  /)( .  The number of final good producers and the price of the 
intermediate good satisfy: 
( 18 ) , yYk /
and 
( 19 ) 
Y
fcY
YR
c
w
p
R
 )(1 , 
respectively.  Furthermore, the number of urban workers required for production is 
related to variety by: 
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( 20 ) . )( fcYmN 
The price of an intermediate good, the wage rate, and the total production of the final 
good are respectively: 
( 21 ) N
Y
fcYNpp  )( , 
( 22 )  NNww  )( ,
( 23 ) ,   100 )( NNYY
where   is a parameter defined by: 
( 24 ) 







1
)(
fcY
yF
y
Y . 
Proof: 
The production of the final good by a producer is: 
( 25 ) .    10 )(ymFy
Substituting this into the first-order condition for a final good producer ( 4 ) and the 
free-entry condition ( 9) yields: 
( 26 ) ,   )()1)(( ymFyFp 
( 27 )    mpyymF 1)( .
From these two equations, we obtain ( 16 ). 
The profit maximization and the zero-profit conditions, ( 14 ) and ( 15 ), for an 
intermediate good producer are now: 
( 28 ) )(YR
p
wcp
R , 
( 29 ) . 0)(  wfYwcp
These two conditions immediately yield ( 17 ). 
Now that once Y  and y  are determined, the number of final good producers is 
given by .  Equation yYk / ( 20 ) follows immediately from ( 10 ). 
Substituting ( 20 ) into the first-order condition for the final good producer ( 26 ) 
and noting ( 16 ), we can rewrite the price of an intermediate good as ( 21 ).  From ( 19 ) 
we can also see that the wage rate satisfies ( 22 ).  From yYk / , and ( 25 ) we obtain the 
total production of the final good ( 23 ).  ■ 
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 This lemma shows that the total production of an intermediate good, Y, the amount 
of an intermediate good used by a final good producer, y, the number of final good 
producers, k, and the relative price between an intermediate good and labor, , are all 
determined by the equilibrium conditions within the urban production sector and do not 
depend on city size or conditions in other parts of the economy.  We assume that 
conditions 
wp /
( 16 ) and ( 17 ) uniquely determine y and Y.  The lemma also shows that 
differentiated intermediate goods yield agglomeration economies: that is, the total 
production in a city exhibits increasing returns-to-scale.  The price of an intermediate 
good and the wage rate are also increasing in city size. 
Commuting costs, housing, and the rural sector 
An urban worker consumes housing with quality h , which is assumed exogenously 
fixed.  We ignore h  as it is fixed, and for simplicity assume housing only requires land as 
an input. 
Each worker has one unit of labor and supplies it to the producers of the 
differentiated consumer goods.  The total endowment of labor in the economy is N .  
There are n cities with labor force N.  The labor force in the rural area is denoted by .  
As noted before, we assume that the rural product is the same as the urban final product.  
The production function of the rural sector is 
AN
)( AA NGY  , where the marginal product is 
. )()( AAA NGNw 
As in Venables (2007), we assume that urban workers do not receive a share of the 
land rent revenue.  The budget constraint for an urban worker is: 
( 30 )  for all )()(0 zrztxw  ]ˆ,0[ zz , 
where  is the commuting cost for a worker living at distance )(zt z  from the CBD,  
is housing rent, and z  is the edge of a city.  We assume that the rent is zero at the 
periphery of the city.  Note that commuting requires only the final good as an input.  In 
equilibrium, the housing rent differentials completely offset the commuting cost 
differentials such that: 
)(zr
ˆ
( 31 )  for all . )ˆ(0 ztxw  ]ˆ,0[ zz
In order for the housing market to be in equilibrium, all urban residents must find a 
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place to live in the city: 
( 32 ) , )1(
ˆ
0
ˆ
0
ˆ)1()(    zdzzdzznN zz
where as in Venables (2007) we have assumed .  From this equation, z  
satisfies: 
 zzn )1()(  ˆ
( 33 ) . )1/(1ˆ  Nz
Transport costs are assumed to satisfy .  The transport costs of a worker at the 
periphery of the city are: 
tzzt )(
( 34 ) , 1)ˆ(  tNzt
where we define: 
( 35 ) 1
1
1 
 
 . 
The aggregate transportation costs in a city (measured in terms of the final product) are: 
( 36 ) ),(
ˆ
0
tNTCtNdztzkzTC
z   
 . 
The aggregate housing (land) rent is: 
( 37 )   tNdztzztzLR
z


   11)ˆ()1(ˆ0 . 
Free mobility of workers requires that the utility levels equalize across cities and 
between the rural area and the cities: 
( 38 ) )()( 1 nNNwtNNw A   . 
This determines the city size, N.  The stability of migrational equilibrium requires that: 
( 39 ) 0)(')1()( 2   nNNnwNtNw A . 
3. Benefits of transportation investment: a fixed number of cities 
First, assuming that the number of cities is fixed, we obtain the benefits of an 
improvement in transportation.  Starting from a symmetric equilibrium with equal-sized 
cities, we examine the effects of a transportation improvement that occurs in only one of 
the cities, that is, City 1.  Utility levels equalize between the cities and the rural area.  As 
the consumption of an urban worker is  and the consumption of a 10 )ˆ(
 tNwztwx
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rural worker is )( nNNwA  , the equilibrium conditions are: 
( 40 ) ))1(()( 11111 NnNNwNtw A   , 
( 41 ) ))1(( 11 NnNNwtNw A   , 
where superscript 1 denotes City 1 and variables without a superscript are other cities.  
Given the lemma holds in each city, the wage rates satisfy  and .  
The above equations then determine the populations of City 1 and other cities as functions 
of transport costs: 
)( 11 Nww  )(Nww 
( 42 ) , )( 111 tNN 
( 43 ) . )( 1tNN 
Given there is only a single consumption good in our model, we can define the 
social surplus as the total amount of the good available for consumption: 
( 44 ) 
 
))()1()((
)),(())(()1()),(())((
111
11
0
11111
0
tNntNNG
ttNTCtNYnttNTCtNYS


. 
The following theorem obtains the impact of a transportation improvement on the social 
surplus. 
 
Theorem 1 (Second-Best Cost–Benefit Analysis)  When the number of cities is fixed, a 
marginal reduction in transportation costs changes the social surplus by: 
( 45 ) TwT MBdt
dNn
dt
dNMB
dt
dS 


  11
1
1 )1( , 
where  is the direct benefit of a transportation investment in City 1 defined as the 
reduction in transportation costs in City 1: 
TMB
( 46 ) 
)(),( 1
1
11 N
t
tNTCMBT 
 , 
and w  is the distortion in the wage rate: 
( 47 ) 0)()()(' 000  N
NY
N
NYNYw  . 
Proof: 
Differentiating the social surplus ( 44 ) with respect to  yields: 1t
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( 48 ) 



 


 


 

11
1
1
0
1
1
11
0
1
)1(
)1(
dt
dNn
dt
dNMB
dt
dNG
N
TC
dN
dYn
dt
dNG
N
TC
dN
dYMB
dt
dS
wT
T

. 
From: 
( 49 )    ')1()1( ')1()1()( 221
211
1
1
A
A
nwNtwNtw
wnNtwN
dt
dN

 




 , 
( 50 )   ')1()1( ')( 221
11
1
A
A
nwNtwNtw
wN
dt
dN
 



 , 
we obtain: 
( 51 ) 0
')1(
)()1( 2
11
11
1
 

AnwNtw
N
dt
dNn
dt
dN


 , 
where the inequality results from the stability condition for migrational equilibrium ( 39 ).  
This immediately yields ( 45 ).  ■ 
 
This theorem shows that a transportation improvement increases the total urban 
population and there will be positive additional benefits.  As shown, a transportation 
improvement in City 1 tends to increase its population.  Moreover, this creates 
agglomeration benefits in addition to the direct user benefits because the social value of 
an additional worker exceeds the wage rate.  However, this process also reduces the size 
of other cities and these adverse effects in other cities (partially) offset the benefits in City 
1.  If the population of the rural area (or equivalently, the total population of the urban 
areas) is fixed, then these effects cancel each other out and there will be no extra benefits: 
( 52 ) TMBdt
dS  1 . 
Note that the Harberger formula is valid in our model: that is, the benefit of a given 
transportation improvement is the sum of the reduction in transportation costs (i.e., the 
direct benefit) and the changes in the excess burden.  In our model of differentiated 
intermediate goods, however, the production of an intermediate good is uniquely 
determined by profit maximization and free-entry conditions in the urban sector and is 
unaffected by any transportation improvement.  The only distortions that then matter 
relate to variety and the wage rate.  Furthermore, these two distortions are in proportion to 
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each other and so in effect, we only have a single distortion.  This distortion makes the 
urban population (or equivalently, the variety of intermediate products) too small and so a 
transportation improvement yields additional benefits if it increases urban population. 
4. Transportation investment with an induced change in the number of 
cities 
Next, we examine the case where a transportation investment induces a change in 
the number of cities, that is, the creation of new cities or the disappearance of existing 
cities.  We first examine the condition for optimal city size. 
The condition for optimal city size: the second-best Henry George Theorem 
If all cities are identical, the net social surplus is: 
( 53 ) )(),()(0 nNNGtNnTCNnYS  , 
where: 
( 54 ) 
tNtNTC ),( . 
The following theorem derives the condition for the optimal number of cities, assuming 
the number of cities is a continuous variable. 
 
Theorem 2 (Second-Best Henry George Theorem) The change in surplus caused by a 
change in the number of cities is: 
( 55 ) nwNnLRdn
dS  . 
If the number of cities is optimal, we have: 
( 56 ) 0 nwNnLRdn
dS  . 
Proof: 
Differentiating the social surplus with respect to the number of cities yields: 
   nAN NwTCYnGNTCYdn
dS  '00 . 
Combining  with migrational equilibrium condition wNY 0
NwA
( 38 ) yields 
.  Hence, the change in surplus is: tNwNY 0
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( 57 ) 
 
nw
n
NnLR
NtNwtNYntNtN
dn
dS




  )('1 110 , 
which must be zero if the number of cities is optimal.  ■ 
 
If the number of cities is too large (small), then the city size is too small (large), in 
which case nm NN
mnLRdndS /  is negative (positive).  Note that in Venables,  is 
constant and hence .  Hence,  cannot be zero, implying that either the rural 
workers or the urban workers disappear when the number of cities is optimal. 
Aw
0nN dndS /
Transportation investment 
We have seen that when the number of cities is fixed, the distortion associated with 
agglomeration externalities yields additional benefits.  If the number of cities changes, 
equations ( 42 ) and ( 43 ) must be modified to: 
( 58 ) , ))(,( 1111 tntNN 
( 59 ) . ))(,( 11 tntNN 
Theorem 1 is now as follows. 
 
Theorem 3 (Variable Number of Cities) When the number of cities is variable, a 
marginal reduction in transportation costs changes the social surplus by: 
( 60 )   


  11
1
11 )1( dt
dNn
dt
dN
dt
dnNnLRMB
dt
dS
wnwT  . 
Proof: 
Substituting ( 58 ) and ( 59 ) into the social surplus ( 44 ) and differentiating it with respect 
to  immediately yields the theorem.  ■ 1t
 
If the number of cities is optimal, then 0

n
NnLR w , and we obtain the same 
results as with a fixed number of cities.  If the city size is too large (i.e., the number of 
cities is too small), then 
n
NnLR w 
   is positive.  A decrease in transport costs in City 1 
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will then be more likely to reduce the number of cities because City 1 becomes more 
attractive than these other cities.  In such a case, the induced effect has a tendency to 
reduce the social surplus if the city size is too large. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This article obtained cost–benefit measures for the situation where monopolistic 
competition with differentiated products provides the microfoundation of agglomeration 
economies.  The major results are as follows.  First, while the Harberger formula for 
excess burden is also valid in our model, the production of the intermediate good is 
unaffected by a transportation improvement if the number of cities is fixed.  Furthermore, 
the variety and wage rate distortions are in proportion, and so in effect, we have only a 
single distortion.  This distortion makes the urban population too small and so a given 
transportation improvement yields additional benefits if it increases urban workers.  Our 
measure of excess burden is equivalent to the agglomeration externality measure in 
Venables (2007) with a reduced-form aggregate production function.  Note that we obtain 
equivalence because the production of a differentiated good is unaffected by 
transportation investment.  In a richer model where this does not hold, the equivalence 
will be broken. 
Second, an improvement in urban transportation in one city increases the 
population in that city, but reduces the populations in other cities.  If the population of the 
rural area (or equivalently, the total population of the urban areas) is fixed, then the 
changes in the excess burden cancel each other out and only the direct benefit remains.  
Further, if migration between the rural area and cities is possible, then a transportation 
improvement increases the total urban population and there will be positive additional 
benefits.  If the number of cities changes, we have an additional change in the excess 
burden, but the result depends on whether the city size is too large.  In the former, the 
induced effect on the number of cities has a tendency to reduce the social surplus. 
There are two practical implications of our findings.  First, at least in a model of 
differentiated intermediate products, one can use a reduced-form aggregate production 
function, as in Venables (2007), to estimate the benefits of transportation improvements.  
Second, whether or not substantial agglomeration benefits exist depends on where the 
new workers are from.  If they are from another city with similar agglomeration 
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economies, there will be little additional benefit.  Conversely, if they are from rural areas 
with no agglomeration economies, or from small cities with only small agglomeration 
economies, the additional benefits may be substantial.4 
Graham (2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) and Department of Transport (2005, 2008) 
employ a framework unlike Venables (2007) in modeling urban agglomeration.  These 
particular studies use the concept of ‘effective density’ to measure relative proximity to 
urban activities, as defined for each location using a gravity model-type equation; for 
example, the weighted sum of the number of workers with weights determined as a 
decreasing function of distance.  However, even in a model of this type, we need to 
consider the adverse effects on areas that lose workers.  We defer to future work the 
analysis of a second-best benefit measure based on the microfoundation for effective 
density. 
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